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Abstract
The most popular system for providing practical low-
latency anonymity on the Internet is Tor. However,
many other tools besides Tor exist as both free and
commercial solutions. In this paper, we consider
ﬁve most popular low-latency anonymisation services
that represent the current state of the art: single-
hop proxies (Perfect Privacy and free proxies) and
Onion Routing based solutions (Tor, I2P, and Jon-
Donym). We assess their usability and rank them
in regard to their anonymity. We also assess their
eﬃciency and reliability. To this end, we deﬁne a
set of metrics and present extensive measurements
based on round-trip time, inter-packet delay variation
and throughput. Apart from the technical realization,
economic aspects are also crucial for anonymous com-
munication systems. In order to attract more users,
which is mandatory in order to improve anonymity
per se, systems need to exhibit a certain payoﬀ. We
therefore deﬁne an economic model that takes all rel-
evant aspects into consideration. In this paper, we
describe the results obtained, lessons learned, and
provide guidance for selecting the most appropriate
system with respect to a set of requirements.
1 Introduction
For various reasons, people want to protect their iden-
tity when communicating over the Internet. Doing
so, they protect their privacy. Freedom of expression
may be one motivation, while another reason may be
a company or customer with the need to stay anony-
mous1 for certain business transactions.
Based on this need, the aim of this paper is to com-
pare existing implementations of anonymising sys-
tems with respect to users' requirements such as per-
formance and usability, also taking into account as-
pects of anonymity and security as well as the real
costs, i.e., monetary costs the user faces. To this end,
we assessed ﬁve tools that represent the diﬀerent ap-
proaches and the current state-of-the-art in practical
anonymisation: free proxies, Perfect Privacy 2, Jon-
Donym 3, Tor 4, and I2P 5.
1The term anonymity derives from the Greek word ανωνυµια
and means "without a name" or "namelessness"
2http://www.perfect-privacy.com
3https://anonymous-proxy-servers.net/en/index.html
4http://torproject.org
5http://www.i2p2.de/
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In recent years, research in anonymity has been
very active, with many approaches developed. How-
ever, only a very few of these reached wide-scale de-
ployment and are used in practice. The predominant
system in use today is Tor, developed by Dingledine
et al. (2004). Tor is considered to be a low-latency
anonymisation tool, which means that data is sup-
posed to be delivered within a reasonable time, al-
lowing the usage of interactive applications such as
web browsing.
In contrast, high-latency systems such as Mixmas-
ter and Mixminion, developed by Moeller et al. (2003)
and Danezis et al. (2003) respectively, provide a high
degree of anonymity and should be considered for ex-
change of more sensitive information. As a draw-
back, communications like anonymous web browsing
would not practically possible because of the long
delays. Beside these, several other anonymisation
tools exist as both free or commercial solutions follow-
ing diﬀerent design approaches; current low-latency
approaches can basically be divided into single-hop
proxies and Onion Routing approaches, initially in-
vented by Reed et al. (1998).
The easiest solution to hiding the identity of a user
is the use of a single proxy server. Traﬃc is routed
through a node that strips oﬀ the origin IP address
and presents its own instead. The main problem of
single-host proxies is that they are a single point of
failure in regard to availability and trust.
The current step in the evolution of anonymous
networks is Onion Routing, where messages are en-
crypted in layers and sent from one node to the next.
At each hop one layer of encryption is removed (or
added, depending on the direction) and the result fur-
ther forwarded.
Further, users need to distinguish between services
where one entity operates both the anonymisation
nodes, and the information service (e.g., Perfect Pri-
vacy) and services where nodes can be operated by
independent third parties (e.g., Tor, I2P).
However, independent of the used anonymisation
technique, users' identities may still be discovered
using other techniques such as information leakage
at the application layer. This can be accomplished
through analysis of the HTTP headers or by inter-
section attacks, using language or font presets for in-
stance as proved by Raymond (2000) andWright et al.
(2003). Therefore, either a service to alter HTTP
header information should be provided by proxy ser-
vice operators, or it is recommended to use ﬁltering
proxy on the user side before sending the data to the
anonymisation network.
This superﬁcial classiﬁcation of anonymisation
systems already shows the complexity a user faces
deciding upon an appropriate solution. During this
selection process, several aspects are usually consid-
ered. In addition to the most important aspect, the
degree of anonymity and performance plays a large
role, as do reliability, usability, and economic aspects
(see Fig. 1).
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Figure 1: Aspects of systems selection
In this paper, we examine all relevant incentives
and combine them to provide usage guidance on
already-deployed anonymisation networks by classify-
ing the systems and showing their strength and weak-
nesses. Applying this guidance, users can select the
anonymisation service that best suits their needs in a
concrete situation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as fol-
lows: ﬁrstly, we give an overview of the tools we
compare. Section 2 describes the anonymisation sys-
tems we used for comparison, and is followed by an
overview of related work (Section 3). In Section 4,
we brieﬂy examine usability in regard to its impact
on acceptance of the tools. Further, we measure
and evaluate the performance in terms of round trip
time (RTT), Inter-Packet Delay Variation (IPDV),
and throughput. We classify anonymisers in regard
to their eﬃciency in Section 5 before addressing prac-
tical issues of anonymity and security in Section 6.
In Section 7, we calculate and discuss the aspect of
reliability, before all relevant aspects are combined to
describe the economic impact on a user's decision pro-
cess in Section 8. Finally, Section 9 concludes with
the lessons learned and future work.
2 Anonymisation Systems
The simplest way of hiding someone's identity is to
use of a proxy server. The receiver of the message
only gets the IP address of an intermediate server,
not of the sender. The main drawback is that adver-
saries can easily de-anonymise users by compromis-
ing a server or simply providing one. However, this
service may still assure a basic level of anonymity.
Due to the simple setup, proxy servers are very com-
mon, either as free or commercial solutions and can be
easily found in the Internet. The providers of these
proxy servers are mostly unknown, so one does not
know how trustworthy they actually are. Commer-
cial services exist too, such as Perfect Privacy, which
currently provides 48 servers in 23 countries world-
wide, allowing users to choose either their preferred
proxy or a self-deﬁned cascade of proxies, meaning
that several proxy servers are combined into a chain.
This may increase anonymity and security against an
external adversary, but still has the drawback that
the service as a whole is operated by a single entity.
Perfect Privacy oﬀers a variety of ways of connecting:
users can simply use the servers as an HTTP- SOCKS
proxy6. In addition, users can connect to the proxy
6SOCKS is an Internet Protocol to facilitate routing of packets
using a proxy server
server via OpenVPN, PPTP VPN, or SSH. As long
as the user does not use their own layer of encryption,
the traﬃc from the proxy server to the destination is
not encrypted and consequently completely visible to
the server provider. This is true for all anonymisation
tools presented here.
Another low-latency anonymisation approach pro-
vides the possibility of active mixing7 of the traﬃc
together with Onion Routing. A popular example
of using this approach is JonDonym. Started as an
open source project at the TU Dresden, JonDonym
(formerly known as JAP) became a popular tool to
gain anonymity in the Internet. Users can choose be-
tween several ﬁxed paths, known as cascades, with
nodes provided by JonDonym operators and nodes
operated by other organizations or individuals. Cur-
rently, there are 34 nodes in the network forming 16
cascades. The operators of JonDonym provide two
kinds of service: a free service, usually having two
nodes in a cascade with several hundreds users and
a commercial service with usually three nodes in a
cascade. Compared to the free service, the number
of concurrent participants is relatively low (less than
100). Even though traﬃc mixing is supported in this
approach, to the best of our knowledge, it is not ac-
tivated because of performance issues.
Today's most widely used anonymisation system is
Tor. Also based on onion routing, Tor tries to provide
an acceptable degree of anonymity, while allowing the
use of interactive web applications. Recently, Dingle-
dine (2009) showed that Tor has about 300,000 users
daily and about 2,000 relaying nodes. The main dif-
ference from JonDonym is its volunteer-based node
operation. In order to achieve optimal system per-
formance, Tor currently relies on directory servers,
which gather all relevant information about the net-
work and provide information about the performance
of nodes to the clients.
I2P is a system similar to Tor and JonDonym. In
contrast to JonDonym and Tor, the main objective
of I2P is communication within its own network and
not with external services. As a consequence, there is
currently only one outbound HTTP gateway respon-
sible for all outgoing web traﬃc. Another diﬀerence
from Tor and JonDonym is its fully-distributed net-
work, which has no centralised server for coordination
and organisation. Hence, the network consists of a set
of nodes that communicate with each other in order
to achieve anonymity. All traﬃc is encrypted using
garlic encryption, which combines multiple messages
into one single message to make traﬃc analysis more
diﬃcult.
3 Related Work
In the many years since the establishment of the Inter-
net, network performance has been an extensive ﬁeld
of research, showing diﬀerent issues and optimizations
in a large number of publications, e.g., by Keshav
(1999). In recent years, logical networks, also known
as overlay networks, were introduced to allow the easy
creation of additional network services without mod-
iﬁcation of the underlying network. These have be-
came a popular topic of interest in network research
and shifted several network paradigms to the appli-
cation layer. Peer-to-peer networks and other overlay
network topologies were introduced to improve data
exchange or to add additional functionality. Among
these is anonymity, which elicited so much interest,
that a special ﬁeld of research, anonymous communi-
cation, was established.
Several surveys on anonymous communication sys-
tems exist, e.g., conducted by Kelly (2009) or Ren
7actively delaying and batching messages
et al. (2009). In the work of Pries et al. (2008),
in which the authors describe the concepts of basic
anonymous communication, as well as implemented
systems, the need of low-latency anonymous commu-
nication systems is highlighted. However, most sur-
veys focus on MixNet based schemes based on the ap-
proach of Chaum (1981) for anonymous remailers and
Onion Routing (particularly on Tor); minor work has
been conduction on other network routing-based tech-
niques like Crowds and P2P networks such as Tarzan,
which was developed by Freedman et al. (2002) and
MorphMix, an approach by Rennhard et al. (2002).
Due to its widespread usage with about 300,000 users
daily, existing performance measurements in anony-
mous communication mainly concentrate on Tor. The
main objective is the improvement of performance, for
instance using alternative methods of path selection.
Very often, authors of related publications concen-
trate on throughput improvements in Tor and either
propose algorithms to achieve higher performance or
higher anonymity as shown by Snader et al. (2008).
In contrast, the importance of latency in anonymi-
sation networks as performance metric is highlighted
by Murdoch et al. (2008). However, both publications
consider only a single property, while our study com-
bines these with the variance to determine the overall
performance.
Other relevant matters in choosing the appropri-
ate anonymisation system are rarely considered. The
optimal system needs to be reliable, and also has to
be usable and cheap. Economic aspects are covered
by Acquisti et al. (2003) to build a general model in
order to describe the incentives for participation in
anonymous networks. This approach was elaborated
by Ngan et al. (2010), going one step further and de-
scribing incentives for relaying traﬃc within Tor with
the aim of an overall performance improvement.
The work of Dingledine et al. (2006) emphasizes
the usability and the network eﬀect in anonymisation
networks. The authors argue the importance of us-
ability to increase the user base and, consequently,
on the achievable anonymity. Related to both us-
ability and performance is the time needed for send-
ing and receiving messages. Even when just surﬁng
in the Internet, users expect an appropriate perfor-
mance. If these expectations are not met, users will
most likely not use the service. Various studies have
attempted to ﬁnd out the maximum tolerable time for
loading a website. Diﬀerent numbers can be found in
literature, depending on the culture, etc., but recent
studies studies, e.g., by Kopsel (2006) and Wendol-
sky et al. (2007) conclude that about four seconds is
a maximum tolerable delay for most users.
To the best of our knowledge, to date there has
been no practical comparison of all relevant aspects
(degree of anonymity, performance, usability, reli-
ability, and cost) of already deployed low-latency
anonymisation tools. This paper aims to close this
gap.
4 Usability
As already mentioned, usability is a crucial aspect
since it is essential to attract more users, which is
a prerequisite for improving anonymity. The higher
the number of participants, the better the theoretical
anonymity due to the increased size of the anonymity
set (as in the work of Pﬁtzmann et al. (2009)). Conse-
quently, providers of anonymity services aim to have a
high number of users, which, which incurs the cost of
a degradation in the system's performance. However,
even before evaluating the systems' features, the user
informally evaluates the usability of the anonymisa-
tion system during installation and initial conﬁgura-
tion. This is of particular importance, as she may
already form a negative opinion of the system and
may reject its further use.
To evaluate usability, we use the cognitive walk-
through (CW) method, developed by Wharton et al.
(1992). Hereby users try to accomplish tasks with
the aim of identifying usability issues. The particular
evaluation was divided into three steps:
1. CW1: Installation of the anonymising software.
2. CW2: Conﬁguration of the browser/other soft-
ware.
3. CW3: Veriﬁcation of the anonymised connection.
In the following, we describe these steps more in de-
tail.
CW1: Installation of the anonymising software
Although some prerequisite software installations
may be challenging to inexperienced users, all systems
provide well documented websites to support users
during the installation process. Very often, step-by-
step instructions are given, which vary from a sim-
ple double-click (JonDonym) to some more advanced
conﬁguration being necessary (Tor and I2P).
CW2: Conﬁguration of the browser/other
software
As already mentioned, we tested both free and com-
mercial systems. The two commercial systems, Per-
fect Privacy and the premium service of JonDonym,
have to be paid for in advance. This can by done
by credit card or anonymously by using vouchers (see
Section 6). Thus, the process of paying makes some
additional eﬀort necessary, but is relatively easy to
handle.
The aim of Tor is to protect data transport. For
web browsing, there are no speciﬁc measures to hide
potentially unmasking information as such as browser
type, language settings, and so forth, which is sent by
default to the web server. Therefore the developers
highly recommend the installation of a local proxy
server that modiﬁes or deletes this information be-
fore sending the data. After the installation of the
local proxy server, the ﬁnal step is the same for all
other tested systems: the users have to conﬁgure the
application (in this case, the browser) in order to use
a proxy server. Depending on the browser, the step of
proxy conﬁguration may be diﬃcult for a less sophisti-
cated user the ﬁrst time because of the sometimes not
obvious location of these settings. Only Tor simpliﬁes
this process by installing an add-on (Torbutton) that
that allows the proxy settings to be easily switched
on and oﬀ.
CW3: Veriﬁcation of the anonymised connec-
tion
Once the user has conﬁgured the browser or the ad-
ditional software, she needs to verify whether the
anonymisation service is running properly. On dedi-
cated web sites that reveal the IP address of the con-
necting user, it is easy to check the system's func-
tionality. Some of these web sites8 provide additional
information about security/anonymity issues, like the
connecting IP address, HTTP header information and
whether Java/Javascript is turned on in the browser.
Except for ﬁnding an appropriate website, this step
was found to be relatively easy to accomplish.
8E.g., http://test.anonymity.com
5 Performance
Probably the most important aspect for users on the
Internet, even when acting anonymously, is perfor-
mance. In particular, Round Trip Time (RTT), Inter-
Packet Delay Variance (IPDV) and throughput have
a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the overall performance as
perceived by users. Because this has a direct impact
on the user's satisfaction, we examine these parame-
ters in detail and calculate the overall eﬃciency.
5.1 Testbed environment
All measurements described in this section were
performed between a client (running Ubuntu 10.04,
Intel Core2 Duo, 3GHz, connected at 100Mbit/s
to the campus network and with 300Mbit/s to
the outside world) located at the University of
Luxembourg and two web servers, one located in
Luxembourg and one on St. Vincent Island. The
basic measurement setup is depicted in Figure 2.
In order to allow the comparison of all tools under
the same conditions, we used the HTTP protocol as
the least common denominator supported by all tools.
Client Node A Node B Node C{ {
Webserver 1
Webserver 2
Figure 2: Testbed setup with either one proxy or a
chain of intermediate nodes
For RTT measurements, we chose the Apache web
server benchmarking tool9. It allows measurement
of the time a request needs to get about 200 bytes
from an HTTP server. Even though this approach
involves a certain overhead, it allows a relative
comparison of the systems. In order to consider time-
shifts and varying network usage at diﬀerent times
of a day, we repeated the measurements over six days.
Measurements of IPDV were conducted every
minute over a period of four days, using a dedicated
client-server application. We measured the inter-
arrival time between every sequence sent with a one
second interval in between. The main motivation
of the following measurements is the question of
whether it is possible to use applications such as
VoIP over the anonymisation systems.
Finally, we measured the throughput for three con-
secutive days using GNU wget10. We chose to down-
load ﬁles of two sizes (100KB and 1MB) to examine
the interaction between the amount of the transferred
data and the TCP slow start algorithm. We used
these ﬁle sizes to identify diﬀerences between small
and large ﬁles based on a recent report that states
that the average size of a web site is 320KB ( Google
(2010)). Thus, we cover cases of both smaller and
larger ﬁles.
All measurements were performed using the al-
ready described anonymisation tools, applying the
following settings:
• Free proxies (FP) were chosen from a web page
listing free proxy servers ranked by their perfor-
mance11. As these servers typically have a high
9http://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.0/programs/ab.html
10http://www.gnu.org/software/wget/
11http://proxy.speedtest.at/proxybyPerformance.php?oﬀset=0
ﬂuctuation, we had to switch between servers
during the test, causing signiﬁcant downtimes
(see Section 7).
• Perfect Privacy (PP) currently oﬀers servers at
23 locations worldwide. Some locations provide
only a single server, others up to eight for the
purpose of load balancing. We used three ran-
domly chosen nodes out of 48, located in Ams-
terdam, Moscow, and Chicago.
• JonDonym, using three diﬀerent random pre-
mium service cascades (out of nine), having three
nodes each. Measurements were not performed
using free cascades because the user limit is often
reached and, consequently, the service continu-
ally becomes unavailable.
• Tor with its default conﬁguration, changing cir-
cuits at least every 10 minutes.
• I2P, which also changes internal paths every 10
minutes, but uses always the same single out-
bound server with estimated 1,000 concurrent
users 12.
In addition, we performed the same measurements
without any anonymisation tool. This information
serves as the reference value to calculate the eﬃciency
and performance losses of anonymisation tools.
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5.2 Round Trip Time
Network latency and RTT have a fundamental im-
pact on end-to-end performance in computer net-
works. Voice over IP (VoIP) applications for instance
require a RTT of less than 600ms13 to provide ade-
quate quality.
Evaluating our measurements, signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ences were identiﬁed: the commercial approaches,
Perfect Privacy and JonDonym, show the lowest
average RTTs together with the free proxy, while
Tor and I2P are signiﬁcantly slower by a factor of
three to four. The Cumulative Distribution Function
(CDF) plots (Fig. 3 and 4) show the fraction of
measurements of RTT that are below a certain
value. Taking Tor and I2P as an example, the tests
on the server in Luxembourg show that Tor can
achieve lower RTTs, but between 550ms and 1s, I2P
12http://stats.i2p.to/
13http://www.itu.int/itudoc/itu-t/aap/sg12aap/history/g.114/g114.html
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Figure 5: RTTs measured during one day using Per-
fect Privacy(a) and Tor(b).
performs better, meaning that, for instance in 60%
of the measurements, Tor showed a RTT of about
800ms, while I2P achieved about 720ms. The results
show also that VoIP is only possible with Perfect
Privacy (Amsterdam), FP, and JonDonym with some
restrictions, because their RTTs are less than 400ms
for at least 80% of the measurements.
During our measurements, Perfect Privacy shows
three distinct levels of RTTs with each level ﬂuctuat-
ing in only a narrow band of a few milliseconds (Fig.
5(a)). Due to the usage of TCP packets, this pattern
is most likely created by packet retransmits. The
timeout of TCP packets on GNU/Linux is 3000ms
and would explain the very constant additional de-
lays. This suggests that there was congestion on the
communication line or the proxy server. The same
behaviour has been observed on other Perfect Pri-
vacy proxy servers as well. Tor instead shows a wider
variance of RTT values (see Fig. 5(b)) due to the va-
riety of possible circuits. Possible retransmits are not
easily detectable in this plot.
5.3 Inter-Packet Delay Variation
Interactive real-time applications such as VoIP de-
pend heavily on a constant IPDV. While multime-
dia streaming applications can compensate diﬀering
IPDV by the use of buﬀers, this is not possible in
VoIP. In the sense of Quality of Service of VoIP, IPDV
should be <100ms to avoid distortion14.
Figure 6(a) shows the IPDV observed at both
14http://www.gig-ip.com/help/voip_and_qos_sensors.htm
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Figure 6: Inter-Packet Delay Variations
servers without anonymisation service. The server
in St. Vincent has a smoother and wider distribution,
probably caused by the longer distance between client
and server, compared to the server in Luxembourg.
However, Figure 6 suggests that apart from Perfect
Privacy and JonDonym, no other anonymisation ser-
vice would be able to comply with the recommended
value of IPDV for VoIP applications. The values for
Tor and I2P are far too high for this kind of communi-
cation (Fig. 6(c)), most likely due to congestion. Per-
fect Privacy, the free proxy, and JonDonym in partic-
ular provide a IPDV of less than 50ms (cf. Fig. 6(b)),
and satisfy the requirements for carrying VoIP traﬃc.
5.4 Throughput
In order to evaluate application performance within
diﬀerent scenarios, we measured throughput while
transferring ﬁles with the sizes of 100KB and 1MB.
Due to similarities of the results, only the throughput
results to St. Vincent server are shown here.
The ﬁrst CDF graph (Figure 7(b)) shows the
throughput of an anonymisation system while trans-
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ferring 1MB of data. I2P shows generally the
lowest throughput, while the maximum throughput
was achieved by the Perfect Privacy proxy in Am-
sterdam (1044KB/s). This value was even higher
than the throughput measured without anonymisa-
tion (746KB/s). This is an astonishing result, be-
cause our tests were conducted utilising the HTTP
header option no-cache, so that there should be no
caching on the proxy server. The only explanation
could be the usage of a more powerful connection via
Amsterdam compared to the native connection.
As can be seen in Figure 7(a), the values for trans-
mission of 100KB ﬁles were signiﬁcantly lower, for
Perfect Privacy and without anonymisation tool, by
a factor of 4 - 4.5. This eﬀect may result from TCP
slow start, when the hosts involved try to achieve
the highest throughput for this particular connection
by adapting TCP window size. In Tor and I2P, the
throughput is almost constant for the diﬀerent ﬁle
sizes. The reason for this behaviour, again, is pre-
sumed to be congestion within the network.
5.5 Systems eﬃciency
Even though low-latency anonymisation systems in
general provide the possibility is being used for in-
teractive applications such as surﬁng on the Inter-
net, the question remains how they compare to the
behaviour and performance without any anonymisa-
tion. In this section, we calculate the eﬃciency of
RTT and throughput. We did not include IPDV be-
cause as long as the required threshold value is not
exceeded (e.g., 100ms for VoIP), the actual value is
of no particular interest to the average user.
For the throughput, we calculate the eﬃciency
(ET) for the transfer of 100KB and 1MB data respec-
tively as ratio of the mean throughput (Tmean(ASi))
of the corresponding anonymisation system ASi
to the throughput (Tno-anon) measured without
anonymisation tool (161KB/s and 734KB/s) using eq.
1.
ET (ASi) =
Tmean(ASi)
Tno−anon
(1)
RTT eﬃciency (ERTT) is calculated similarly to
ET: it is the ratio of the RTT without anonymiza-
tion (RTTno_anon) and the mean RTT of ASi
(RTTmean(ASi)).
ERTT (ASi) =
RTTno−anon
RTTmean(ASi)
(2)
To further guide users' decisions, Table 1 lists the
eﬃciencies of throughput and RTT. The value of 1 is
the reference value, accomplished without anonymi-
sation and the higher the value, the more eﬃcient is
the system.
Apart from I2P, all tools show an acceptable eﬃ-
ciency for 100KB ﬁles, but the rates decrease tremen-
dously for the large ﬁles. Here, JonDonym and Tor
show throughput eﬃciencies of less than 30%, I2P
only 5%.
RTT total eﬃciency values are calculated as the
mean of Luxembourg and St. Vincent. Compared to
bandwidth eﬃciencies, these values are even worse.
While again the Perfect Privacy server in Amsterdam
performed well, all other ERTT values are below 40%.
Altogether, these ﬁgures show that current anonymi-
sation systems still suﬀer from poor performance.
Table 1: Throughput and RTT Eﬃciency
Anonymisation System ET (100KB) ET (1MB) ERTT
Free Proxy 1.19 0.88 0.27
PP Amsterdam 1.37 1.17 0.89
PP Moscow 0.88 0.71 0.37
PP Chicago 0.85 0.37 0.40
JonDonym 0.75 0.30 0.36
Tor 0.55 0.19 0.07
I2P 0.18 0.05 0.08
6 Anonymity and Security
Anonymity may be quantiﬁed using diﬀerent metrics,
as a survey of Kelly et al. (2008) shows, but none of
which is comprehensive. In this section, we establish
a thorough classiﬁcation of anonymity for all tested
anonymisation services. Because a quantitative com-
parison of all services is diﬃcult up to impossible (as
there is no existing metric that would consider all
possible attacks) using existing approaches such as
entropy, which is described by Diaz et al. (2002), we
performed an educated anonymity/security appraisal
and ranked attackers in regard to their ability and
costs to de-anonymise users. This ranking is based on
our subjective assessment and may diﬀer from other
classiﬁcations.
The idea is simple: we identiﬁed the diﬀerent
roles of adversaries against systems for anonymous
communication. We then ranked these adversaries
with respect to their power. In order to quantify the
anonymity, we ranked the power of an adversary on
a scale between 0 and 1. The value of 1 means that
the adversary can de-anonymise the involved entities
with a high probability, whereas the value of 0 means
that the adversary is generally harmless with respect
to the considered anonymisation technique. For in-
stance, while a web service provider has limited power
to identify a user coming from an anonymisation net-
work, an Internet exchange (IX) and a Government
has much greater power and abilities. Figure 8 shows
the results of our appraisal.
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Figure 8: Classiﬁcation of anonymisation systems
No single low-latency anonymisation technique
can provide an adequate prot ction against an at-
tacker having a government or anonymisation service
operator status. Therefore, users of anonymisation
systems are required to trust the service operator. Us-
ing for instance Tor, users get good protection against
the Web Service Provider, the Local Network Admin-
istrator (LNA), as well as the ISP. This is due to
the encryption used between the sender and the ﬁrst
Tor node. A node operator and the External Party
(EP) have some more power, as they can add as many
nodes to the network as they have resources. Here,
an External Party is deﬁned as an entity outside the
anonymisation system, that is trying to become a part
of it. Hence, every other entity we consider in our cat-
egorization can be seen as an EP too.
An even more powerful attacker is the Internet
Exchange, as it can observe a considerable amount
of traﬃc between the Tor nodes. Recent studies,
e.g., by Edman et al. (2009) show that there is
a certain risk that provider of large Autonomous
Systems (AS) can control a signiﬁcant number of
entry and exit nodes, hence this is also true for the
corresponding Internet Exchange. Service Operator
and Government or Secret Service are the most
powerful players. They may have enough power to
bias path selection, analyse all network traﬃc, break
the encryption, or even apply non-technical means to
achieve their goal (e.g., rubber-hose cryptanalysis15).
We also diﬀerentiate between the the two available
versions of JonDonym. While the free version
provides a path-length of two nodes, the premium
services always use three nodes. However, we rank
the LNA higher for the premium service due to
simpliﬁed ﬁngerprinting, as proved by Panchenko
et al. (2009) because of a smaller number of users.
Calculating the degree of anonymity using this
classiﬁcation, single values are weighted, summed and
normalized:
15Torture of a person to extract cryptographic secrets, e.g., a
password
A = 1−
n∑
i=1
(wi ∗ ai)
n∑
i=1
wi
, (3)
where ai is the power of attacker i, wi the weight
an user puts on the attacker ai and n is the number
of attackers considered (here: eight). Table 2 shows
the degree of anonymity of the tested anonymisation
services for two particular cases. Case 1 (C1) shows
the values without consideration of any user-based
weighting; C2 could be an employee using services
like eBay at the workplace. Here, we mainly con-
sider the LNA and the WSP as critical, i.e., giving
them a higher weight (LNA: 10, WSP: 3). The other
identities are weighted 1. Overall, Tor achieves the
highest degree of anonymity and the free proxy the
worst. The degree of anonymity of Tor is even higher
than in I2P, mainly given because of the single out-
bound node I2P provides. Due to the higher ranking
of a LNA, the free version of JonDonym may be more
appropriate in C2.
Table 2: Degree of anonymity
Anonymisation System A (C1) A (C2)
Free Proxy 0.18 0.32
Perfect Privacy 0.26 0.42
JonDonym 0.33 0.54
JonDonym 0.36 0.53
I2P 0.44 0.62
Tor 0.47 0.66
In addition to the degree of anonymity, other as-
pects, such as anonymous payment for the use of com-
mercial anonymisation tools, are of relevance too, as
they may directly inﬂuence the anonymity. For exam-
ple, providing the real name and/or the bank account
number would reveal the identity of the user to the
company oﬀering an anonymisation service.
The commercial service providers in this compari-
son, Perfect Privacy and JonDonym, oﬀer an alterna-
tive by also accepting payments by anonymous pay-
ment schemes such as PaySafeCard16 or UKash17.
Users can anonymously buy a code in an ordinary
shop and to pay for the anonymisation service with
this code as with pre-paid telephone cards, but with-
out any personal registration being required. Another
possibility for ensuring anonymity during the pay-
ment process is the usage of anonymous credit cards,
which work either like pre-paid cards or like gift cards.
Pre-paid cards need to be charged before usage, gift
cards can be bought already containing a certain bal-
ance.
Considering the diﬀerence between free and com-
mercial service operators, we cannot preempt the
user's decision to which service is more trustworthy;
users have to trust the operator in both cases. Only
the operator's intention may vary, and range from
commercially-driven to belief in expression of freedom
or the hope of creating a trap to harvest sensitive in-
formation.
7 Network Reliability
The next essential aspect, which is particularly im-
portant for user satisfaction, is the reliability of the
network. We assess it in terms of the failure rate. To
16http://www.paysafecard.com/
17http://www.ukash.com
calculate the failure rate, all unanswered RTT bench-
marking requests were counted during the period of
experiment execution.
A common parameter to describe the failure rate
is MTBF, which expresses the Mean Time Between
Failures of a system. In this context, MTBF is cal-
culated as the sum of the uptime periods divided by
the number of downtimes:
MTBF =
Σ(tdown − tup)
ndown
(4)
where ndown is the number of failures.
We also calculated the Mean Time To Recovery
(MTTR), which is computed in the same way as
MTBF (Equation 5). In order to evaluate reliability,
both factors need to be considered.
MTTR =
Σ(tup − tdown)
nup
(5)
Tables 3 and 4 show that the loss of RTT con-
nections occurred by the free proxy, which is the re-
sult of proxy servers going oﬀ-line periodically from
time to time. During our experiment, we twice had to
switch to a new proxy server. Another issue is related
to the connection to the webserver in St. Vincent,
which showed problems for two hours when some of
the packets did not get through. The relatively high
packet loss of JonDonym was caused by a service in-
terruption of more than two hours. This interruption
only aﬀected JonDonym traﬃc to the server in Lux-
embourg while all other services were working well,
including the connections to St. Vincent. This result
suggests that there was a problem of connectivity be-
tween the ﬁnal JonDonym relay and the server. How-
ever, the numbers only present a snapshot and may
not necessarily reﬂect the long-term behaviour.
Table 3: Snapshot of MTBF and MTTR - St. Vincent
(SV)
AS PL MTBF (SV) MTTR (SV)
None 0.33% 72:54:35 0:00:39
Free Proxy 2.22% 0:10:05 0:04:14
PPA 0.29% 1:20:56 0:01:04
PPM 0.37% 1:05:35 0:01:12
PPC 0.29% 1:21:14 0:01:12
JonDonym 0.36% 1:04:51 0:01:07
Tor 0.36% 0:49:49 0:01:00
I2P 0.56% 0:19:22 0:01:23
Table 4: Snapshot of MTBF and MTTR - Luxem-
bourg (Lux)
AS PL MTBF (Lux) MTTR (Lux)
None 0% 144:23:04 0:00:00
Free Proxy 2.06% 0:38:54 0:00:59
PPA 0.05% 1:02:06 0:01:00
PPM 0.06% 0:05:04 0:01:00
PPC 0.02% 2:45:55 0:01:10
JonDonym 0.76% 3:44:16 1:05:04
Tor 0.06% 1:30:04 0:04:44
I2P 0.22% 0:02:04 0:45:00
Fig. 9 illustrates the number of unanswered RTT
requests during the measuring period. A high number
of lost messages without the use of any anonymisation
system is a sign of a general network problem. How-
ever, the ﬁgure also shows the inﬂuence of path selec-
tion on reliability. It is again possible to see a high
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Figure 9: Lost packets during 6 days
number of lost packets for FP. This result conﬁrms
our observations during previous tests.
Another observation from reliability tests is the
inﬂuence of the server location. Excluding the free
proxy due its outages, connections to the server in St.
Vincent summed up over all services show a higher
loss in total (822) compared to Luxembourg (561).
The reason for this issue may be a general network
problem, not related to any anonymisation service.
Normalising these results, the number of unanswered
RTTs for all services, except I2P and the free proxy
server, is quite low.
8 Economic aspects
Apart from the technical aspects of ﬁnding the appro-
priate anonymisation tool, users have also to decide
on the economic value/cost. Some services rely on an
active participation where users pay indirectly (Ci) by
providing, e.g., computational resources. Using I2P
for instance requires provision of bandwidth and com-
putational power in order to use the network, while in
Tor, users have the choice of either donating resources
by acting as a relay node or as a client only. Paying
indirect costs may be negligible in most cases, but
may, on the other hand, limit the maximum achiev-
able performance. We calculate Ci as the sum of Cr,
Ce and Cb, where Cr is the relaying/routing costs, Ce
costs of de- or encryption (computational eﬀort) and
Cb the costs of providing additional bandwidth.
Ci = Σ(Cr, Ce, Cb) (6)
Using commercial anonymisation systems, users
have to pay fees. These direct costs Cd are based
on usage time or data volume. For instance the busi-
ness model of Perfect Privacy is based on a monthly
fee, oﬀering a data ﬂat rate. JonDonym instead bills
according to the amount of data. Consequently, the
overall costs are calculated as a sum of the two costs:
C = (Ci + Cd) (7)
The payoﬀ costs for every tool are then calculated
as follows:
Pi =
waA ∗ weE ∗ wuU
wrR
− wcC (8)
where A is the degree of anonymity, E the eﬃ-
ciency, R the reliability and U the usability; w{a,e,u,r,c}
are the diﬀerent weights the user deﬁnes depending
on her particular needs. Consequently, the calcula-
tion strongly depends on user requirements and has
to take into account the actual situation.
At ﬁrst glance, users main goal may be a high
degree of anonymity together with a high eﬃciency
and reliability of the system at low cost. This does
not mean that users will not pay for such a service;
statistics for Perfect Privacy show about 25,000 con-
current connections. Even though this might be not
the accurate statistic, it still shows that a fast and
reliable service can attract many users willing to pay
a certain amount of money. Another example is Tor,
with about 300,000 daily users. Tor is also known for
its high anonymity and reliability, even at no cost,
but with the drawback of poor performance. For the
launch of future anonymisation systems, especially for
commercial products, the operators need to take all
these aspects into consideration.
9 Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we have deﬁned a set of metrics in order
to compare and evaluate ﬁve already deployed state-
of-the-art anonymous communication systems in re-
gard to their anonymity, performance, reliability, us-
ability, and cost.
Besides the installation, which is relatively simple
for all systems, the usability of the tools is generally
good and should not be a reason for non-use. Usabil-
ity does not vary not much from the users' point of
view; they always have to conﬁgure their application,
i.e., web browser, to use a proxy server, a process
which is practically the same for all tools.
In order to provide a comprehensive comparison
of the anonymisation tools, we ranked them in regard
to the power of possible adversaries. Our classiﬁca-
tion is subjective and may vary from other opinions,
but gives users an indication of strength and weak-
nesses of corresponding anonymisers. A future goal
might be to simplify the presentation of the results
and present them to users in a more appropriate way.
This will be subject of further work. In addition, we
measured throughput, RTT, IPDV and failure rate
and calculated eﬃciencies. The results show that the
proxy-based anonymisation systems outperform the
Onion Routing approaches in throughput and RTT,
but provide less anonymity. This trade-oﬀ applies
to all systems and in the end, the user must decide
which system best ﬁts her requirements. However,
web browsing is possible using all the tested tools,
even though I2P in particular has long response times.
Latency-critical applications like VoIP, which rely on
highly responsive networks, are only usable to a cer-
tain extent with the the systems we examined.
An important ﬁnding is the eﬃciency of the
throughput performance of single proxy solutions.
They perform as well the native communication,
sometimes even better.
We also observed that the selected anonymisation
path and the recipient's location have a strong in-
ﬂuence on performance and reliability. The Perfect
Privacy proxy in Amsterdam, which outperformed
the communication without anonymisation, demon-
strates this. In general, all Perfect Privacy proxies we
tested, as well as Tor, showed particularly reliability
in terms of successful connections. While JonDonym
and I2P were slightly less reliable, the most unreliable
service was the free proxy service due to a high ﬂuctu-
ation of nodes. This demonstrates the main problem
with single-proxy solutions but makes them applica-
ble to high-performance short term downloads.
Economics in anonymity is still an under-
investigated ﬁeld of research, with only a few publica-
tions. In this paper, we show that besides real costs
in terms of money, all relevant aspects such as per-
formance, anonymity, reliability, usability, and cost,
need to be evaluated in order to calculate system's
payoﬀ. However, as already mentioned, this calcula-
tion strongly depends on individual users' preferences.
To summarise our results, we established a com-
parison table, containing all examined anonymisation
systems. We classiﬁed the systems in ﬁve groups,
expressed on a scale of very good (++), good (+),
average(0 ), bad(-) and very bad(- -). Table 5 shows
this classiﬁcation.
Table 5: Evaluation of anonymous communication
systems
Anonymisation system V A E R C
Free Proxy 0 - - + - - ++
Perfect Privacy 0 0 + + -
JonDonym 0 0 - + -
Tor 0 ++ - - ++ ++
I2P 0 + - - + ++
U = Usability, A = Anonymity, E = Eﬃciency,
R = Reliability and C = Cost.
Overall, Tor shows the best results, followed by
I2P. They score well in all disciplines except perfor-
mance, which is their main weak point. Here, single
proxy solutions score with the best performance.
Unfortunately, their degree of anonymity is poor and
additionally reliability leaves much to be desired.
JonDonym performs averagely, showing no particular
strength or weakness. However, it is very diﬃcult to
consider all users' requirements and it is ﬁnally up
to them to evaluate the results in order to ﬁnd the
most appropriate solution.
To conclude, future work will be necessary in the
following areas:
• Extending the usability evaluations by also in-
volving less sophisticated users,
• Further investigation of the very high throughput
via certain anonymisation paths,
• Economic aspects need to be evaluated in more
detail, especially in regard to business purposes,
• It may be worthwhile to include social aspects
into the proposed payoﬀ function, e.g., particular
group behaviour in an anonymous network.
Overall, this comparison shows the need and mo-
tivation to spend further eﬀort on the improvement
of existing anonymisation services or to work on
alternative solutions.
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